This is an old answer to a school assignment. Incorrect and outdated information may occur.
The Pioneer Phase
The first period in Milorg's history is often called the pioneer phase. In this, Germany was constantly making progress and seemed invincible. Among the youth in Norway there was a lot of pessimism and despondency, but the fighting spirit was in the youth. That's where it all started, some of those who had been in the war days in April 1940 wanted to do more. They hid away large amounts of weapons and equipment, and they continued to have contact with each other in smaller groups. Sports teams and other groups of friends also formed groups. The great sports dispute in the autumn of 1940 helped increase the will to resist among the sports youth. In order to get order in these independent groups, they had to come together, and this happened in two ways:
1). Several of the independent groups were gathered locally.
2). A nationwide central leadership from the autumn of 1940, gathering all the groups into a large network.
It was in Eastern Norway that most Milorg groups were built up, and one of the reasons why the group gained such great popularity was the work of the inspirer Knut Møyen. He made a great effort to gather the military resistance groups. He took over the work with this after Halftan Haneborg Hansen who had already started this work in 1940. Unfortunately, he did not have a great sense of security, and therefore the organization was quickly infiltrated by the Germans. This led to a number of raids in 1941, and when Haneborg Hansen was arrested, Knut Møyen took over this work. Møyen was a very cautious man and took no chances, which is why he introduced several strict security principles. Møyen managed to keep the organization going with training tasks and missions within the framework that was possible with limited access to weapons and instructors. Alongside Knut Møyen worked the young law student Hans Christian Hauge, who, as is known, later became a leader in Milorg, and the experiences he brought with him during this first phase benefited the entire Milorg. German patrols out in the streets, a common sight throughout the war.
When the central leadership in 1940 wanted to bring together the different groups, a supreme body, the Council, was formed. This Council consisted of about 4 members throughout the war. In 1940, the Council sent a letter to the king requesting status as a recognized organization. This letter was further sent to the government and discussed there. The Council had developed guidelines for Milorg which the government then asked to take a position on.
Milorg's guidelines were carefully thought out and there was little wildness and a lot of responsibility. Among other things, they were against sending weapons and instructors to Norway at that time, for security reasons. Milorg was approved by the Norwegian Armed Forces on 20 November 1941 as a recognized organization in cooperation with SOE, but received clear instructions from SOE that if they were to have any significance at all, they had to be organized from scratch. Sending weapons/instructors had to happen even if it was not to be used immediately. Milorg was subordinated to the defense high command in London, and when FO was rebuilt in 1942, it was decided that Milorg would be the fourth defense body. A separate group was established, FO 4, which was again divided into two. One part was to take care of the construction and organization of Milorg, operations carried out by Milorg and the connection between Milorg and London. The other part was NORIC 1, the Linge company. The military inspector in Stockholm also got his own office for handling Milorg cases.
At the end of 1942, the Gestapo began to recruit people within Milorg in full force. Those who worked in the resistance movement had no experience of illegal work, and one day things were bound to go wrong. The Gestapo got on the trail of some groups and attacked in Western Norway, in Northern Norway, Southern Norway and Eastern Norway. Much of what had been built up over two years was now destroyed. It was later said that the years 1941 and 1942 were a hardening period for Milorg, but it was not only this phase that was needed for Milorg to become a real military organization. In this pioneer phase, there were approximately 20,000 men in the organization and there were 1.3 radio stations on the air.
The long uphill climb
This phase was difficult for Milorg, the mobilization in 1942 made the situation difficult. Recruitment and popularity were declining. London was not very cooperative, and the Central Command opposed the entire Milorg idea. The communists who were on the Allied side would rather switch to Yugoslav warfare, partisan warfare. The Armed Forces High Command and Milorg himself struggled hard to find a solution to all the problems and Milorg's future. At the end of 1942, Milorg prepared a list of central issues and a draft of positions. The list was called the Partisan Letter and the Council drew important conclusions. Two of the most important are reproduced here:
- Under certain conditions, the Council assumes that Milorg can make an effort of military significance for the invasion army.
- An army behind enemy lines has a national significance in addition to the military side. The final decision on whether Milorg should be deployed during a possible Allied invasion must be made by our authorities in England.
Before Milorg received any response from London, it became known that the civilian leadership at home, the Circle, had sent a letter to the government warning against the whole Milorg idea. They characterized Milorg as irresponsible and said that they were an insult to the civilian struggle that had been waged with great success in 1942. The Milorg leadership was bitter about this, because they believed that they had documents so thorough for the organization that it was enough to convince the proper authorities. Fortunately, the government did not take the warnings seriously and continued to support Milorg.
In order to sort out all the mess between the civilian leadership (the Circle) and the military leadership (the Council), a meeting was called in Stockholm in March/April 1943. Ferdinand Sheldrup and Hans Halvorsen participated from the Circle, and Ola Branstorp and Jens Christian Hauge from the Council. At this meeting, some of the distrust of Milorg was removed from the Circle and other misunderstandings were cleared up. This meeting formed the basis for further cooperation between the two parts of the home front, and it also led to Milorg coming into contact with several important people within the civilian organization.
In April 1943, the Council approved a sabotage action for the first time. They acted here without approval from the defense high command and SOE. The sabotage action was directed at the labor service office in Pilestredet, Oslo. Olav Helset played a small significant role during the action in Pilestredet. At the turn of the year 1942/43, he had been released from a German prison and taken an active role within Milorg. After a short time he became the chairman of the Council. He gave new hope, new spirits and he strengthened the belief that Milorg was doing something useful, despite adversity.
In May, the Armed Forces High Command and Milorg met at the military inspectors in Stockholm to clarify the guidelines for cooperation between them. At this meeting, there was no longer any talk of closing down Milorg, but of clarifying cooperation abroad (with SOE) and at home. The background to this meeting was that the government was dependent on the Allies helping to build Milorg. SOE did not want a large, insecure organization, they would rather have small groups that were controlled directly from England. However, the resistance movement was a fact and therefore SOE had to conform to the Norwegians. The most important decisions that were clarified here were that young people who were ready to take up arms should be trained in weapons. FO decides to what extent Milorg should be trained in weapons, and that FO can use other home front groups in Norway to maintain the security of Milorg. It was also decided that the Central Management would be responsible for organizational and administrative work, while FO would have full command authority.
By the end of 1943, there was little help to be had from the Allied authorities. SOE had little to offer in the way of instructors, instructional material, and radio communications. What happened in Norway was mostly isolated acts of sabotage, such as the action against the heavy water factory at Rjukan.
These years from 1942 were difficult, but still a decisive and exciting time. It was during these years that Milorg grew into a permanent organization that could be used during the liberation. The leaders lacked contact with England, and the passivity of the Allies in Norway meant that the only thing the leaders had to give to the Milorg soldiers who wanted instructors and instructional material were papers from the Armed Forces High Command. During this difficult phase, the number of Milorg people had increased to about 30,000.
Towards liberation
Early in Milorg's history, it was clear that their main task would be the liberation, and that they would maintain peace and order. A directive outlined four surrender alternatives, describing Milorg's task at the liberation.
In London, a separate department had now been established in SOE that was involved in the liberation of Norway. The head of this department was Sir. Andrew Thorne. Under him, he had a staff that consisted of two British divisions (50th and 52nd divisions), the Norwegian brigade in Scotland, the Norwegian police troops in Sweden and not least Milorg. Everything that had to do with the liberation of Norway was unknown and therefore a new basic directive was drawn up for Milorg under three alternatives. Milorg was given high priority in this phase. They were to be equipped and trained by SHAEF, with the goal of becoming a Norwegian home force that the Allies could really use. While there were negotiations about this directive in London, they were more concerned at home with the so-called identification problem. Would those forces be recognized by the Norwegians? Without uniforms or other distinguishing marks. Battledresses (American uniforms) were arranged from the Norwegian-American Georg Vetelsen who worked for SOE and FO. He obtained about 50,000 uniforms, but they went to France after the invasion there. They did not become uniforms, but instead knickerbockers and armbands. A Milorg group on training in Scotland.
After the invasion of Normandy on July 6, 1944, the Allies realized that it was wise to focus more on the home forces. Up until then, they had banned all sabotage, but when they saw how French resistance groups helped the Allies protect important targets, they changed their minds. Previously, the Allies had preferred that they had the fighting against the Germans in one place, but after the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes, they realized even more importantly that the home forces had to help. Milorg then received a clear message: .To prevent the Germans as much as possible from retreating to the continent.. This message was received by the Milorg chief when he was in London in July/August 1944 to negotiate increased self-determination. Just before he was to return home, the message came that the Milorg leadership was free to carry out sabotage, within SHAEF's directives, and primarily against railways and roads. For the Milorg people, this was an enormous source of inspiration; finally they could do what they really wanted. It was after this that Norway was given full priority by SOE. The shipments of weapons were increased considerably, and in total during this phase 200 instructors and weapons were sent to 30,000 - 40,000 men. 200 pilots and crew were killed on these trips to Norway, in the last phase in 1944/45.
The training equipment quickly came into use and the instructors were soon conducting intense training in forests and mountains around Norway, with the Milorg soldiers. The training took on a realistic character. In the Mattrefjellene mountains near Bergen, there was a battle against the Germans and Milorg soldiers. They defended themselves well and thus they knew that they were an organization that could hold their own in a war situation. In December 1944, a major directive was sent from the Central Management to the district commanders. The directive stated that they were to break the railway lines to the shipping ports from Kristiansand to Halden, the lines from the north to Oslo were to be spared in favor of the civilian population. The action was launched in March 1945 and was very successful. Only one person was killed. Lots of railway lines, bridges and bunkers were destroyed.
It was now clear that the Germans would be defeated, but it was uncertain when. General Thorne, who was responsible for the liberation of Norway, had always had a liking for Milorg. And he protested strongly when the Allied forces that were going to Norway wanted to lay off these armed civilians. He gave clear instructions that they were an essential part of his forces in Norway. And it was these forces that first emerged on May Day 1945. These forces are better known as the "Gutta på skauen".
The Liberation
On May 7, 1945, the mobilization command came from England to proceed according to the provisions for One of Norway's most notorious gang leaders, Henry Rinnan, is here taken to the arrest, after a will up in the mountains. .the capitulation alternative.. The first part of this plan was to occupy the so-called vulnerable points, such as ports, communications, junctions, etc. It was a matter of preventing any form of sabotage. The next part was to occupy public buildings and railways for the legally elected government. Finally, the last part was to disarm and arrest Nazis in key positions. The lists of Nazis to be arrested had been prepared in advance, to avoid misunderstanding. When the Allied forces arrived in the country a few days later, it looked as if Norway was a free country, with armed Milorg guys in the streets keeping order.
Norwegians in the streets and legally elected Norwegian government. There were about 40,000 men who had helped take over Norway again, without uniforms and state-of-the-art machine guns. Shortly after the liberation, the home front (mostly Milorg people) and the foreign front merged into a unified Norwegian front. They were disbanded on June 15, 1945, after their last major mission, and met the king when he returned home.
Receiving weapons
Throughout the spring of 1945, Milorg had received weapons and equipment from the Allies. Large containers were flown over from England at night and dropped at agreed-upon locations in forests and fields. The Germans were aware of this but were unable to stop it, even though they launched a powerful campaign of intimidation. In the final phase of the war, large forces of police and soldiers were deployed from the German side in the search for Milorg camps and drop sites. There were a number of raids, but there was only fighting in a couple of places. Once, things almost went wrong in Oppkuven in Nordmarka near Oslo. A group from Milorg lay one night at an agreed drop site waiting for a plane. No sooner had the Englishmen dropped the cargo than a German plane appeared. Paratroopers jumped out. They landed at the drop site and commanded: "Halt! Hande hoch!" The Milorg men did not listen, the Germans fired, and only with difficulty and barely did they escape while the bullets whizzed around their ears. Crates that were used to fly in weapons and equipment.
Sabotage actions
It was not until 1944 that Milorg was authorized to carry out sabotage actions. The actions before this were mostly carried out by independent groups. The Lingekompaniet also carried out some sabotage actions against train lines, but there were not many of these actions. It was difficult to carry out actions in the Lingekompaniet because they were so few and it would take too long to gather all the guys who were scattered all over the country.
Here the "Donau" is grounded outside Drøbakk after a sabotage operation carried out by the .Oslo gang. .Donau. was used for troop transport, but is best known in Norway for the transport of Norwegian Jews to Germany. Although Milorg was not authorized to carry out sabotage operations until 1944, they had to break this instruction in April 1943. Quisling wanted to mobilize three year classes of youth in Norway for labor service. Most thought this was ordinary civilian work that was to be carried out, and most registered when the .Law on General Norwegian Labor Contribution. came on February 22, 1943. Quisling did not have a civilian service in mind, but a Norwegian Nazi army. The Milorg leadership and the Linge Company understood this, these two organizations planned a sabotage operation against the Labor Service office in Pilestredet, Oslo. Milorg boss Jens Christian Hauge and the leader of the "Oslo gang" (a sub-group of the Lingekompaniet) Max Manus planned the action together.
The plan was to blow the labor office to smithereens, this was actually quite simple, but it was important to think about the people who worked there. It wasn't just Nazis, but also others. They also brought along two others from the Oslo gang. Gregers Gram and Gunnar Sønsteby. Hauge and managed to get a key to the building, and together they went in. Manus, Gram and Sønsteby placed the explosive charges, while Hauge went into the office and said that the building would be blown up in two minutes. When they came out, they jumped on bicycles they had left and cycled away. Shortly afterwards the building exploded. The next day there was a large pile of ash on the site where the building had been. The operation was successful and it postponed Quisling's plans, which also came to nothing later.
Another important operation was against the Kongsberg Weapons Factory. Again, Max Manus and Jens Christian Hauge were responsible for planning and executing the operation. This time, they were joined by the Chief of Military Operations in the Kongsberg District and Arne Guneid. They were to destroy two large generators and two large cannons that were ready for use.
At 10:00 p.m., the four of them entered the weapons factory after careful planning to make sure that the German guards would not see them. Sønsteby had brought ¾ of the explosives, the rest Arne Guneid had hidden in the factory where he worked. They assembled the explosives, a total of 85 kilograms. At 11:00 p.m., they pressed the timer, and four hours later it went off. The operation was successful, not a single human life was lost this time either. The only people affected were the neighbors whose windows were blown out by the explosion.
By the end of June 1944, the Oslo gang had strafed the German aircraft factory at Korsvoll, destroyed 25 Messerschmitt fighters and 140 aircraft engines waiting to be transported to the Luftwaffe. They had also attacked and destroyed a factory at Lysaker that produced sulfuric acid for the Germans' explosives, effectively destroying the production facilities at the locomotive factory in Kragerø and the oil plant at Loenga.
Milorg carried out several sabotage operations from the autumn of 1944 until the liberation. They also brought other resistance organizations with them, especially the Linge Company. The largest of the sabotage operations was the "Railway Sabotage" in March 1945. The Kongsberg Operation was also one of the major ones.
Milorg's central management
Milorg was a nationwide organization and therefore it was important to gather all groups in a large network. This was to keep track of all the different groups and to be able to get out information quickly. At the same time as it was important, the organization's security had to be maintained, because the Gestapo had informers and spies everywhere. If someone were to be arrested, the entire organization did not have to be unraveled. Those who were interrogated by the Gestapo were rarely able to keep quiet, as they were subjected to the most cruel methods of torture. Many had poison ampoules in their mouths ready to swallow if they were caught, but this could not be used as a guarantee that the organization's employees would keep quiet. It was fine to have the poison ampoule in their mouths, but swallowing it was something else entirely.
The organization was therefore organized so that everyone would have a cover name and no one would know more than their boss and the men in their group. A central leadership was therefore created (see sketch on the next page). We can see here that the central leadership was controlled by the Council with the four other organizations they had contact with. The Council had contact down to MK, and from there on to. I and O. I was the district manager for the districts. There were six large I's who were responsible for their districts with their district managers. The districts from 11 . 24 were again divided into their small districts. Rakkestad is under district manager I.1, district 11, which had four sub-districts. 111 Ski, 112 Moss, 113 Fredrikstad, Sarpsborg, Halden and 114 inner Østfold. In Rakkestad there were again several small groups. O was the secretariat of the Council, and they had several groups under them that arranged for different tasks within Milorg.
We can see from this arrangement that it was very difficult to get in touch with the Council. If someone at the very bottom of the organization were to crack, it would take longer for the Gestapo to unravel the entire organization. Those in leading positions would then have time to flee.
Sources
The Resistance Movement Gyldendal Publishing House
The Liberation in Pictures Gyldendal Publishing House
Aschehoug and Gyldendal's Lexicon Gyldendal Publishing House
Milorg under occupation 1940-1945 Jens.Ch.Hauge
Behind the reports Gunnar Sønsteby
The Home Forces (Norwegian War) Helge Sivertsen
Behind the German lines Thomas Nielsen